The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing Nazi-Looted Art by Graefe, Emily A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 2 Article 4
3-1-2010
The Conflicting Obligations of Museums
Possessing Nazi-Looted Art
Emily A. Graefe
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Emily A. Graefe, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing Nazi-Looted Art, 51 B.C.L. Rev. 473 (2010),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol51/iss2/4
THE CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS  
OF MUSEUMS POSSESSING 
NAZI-LOOTED ART 
Abstract: During the Nazi regime, much of Europe’s art was pillaged. This 
Note addresses the conflicts faced by museums when an original owner or 
heir of artwork brings an ownership claim against a piece in the museum’s 
collection. Because of their fiduciary duties, museums are encouraged to 
protect trust assets. Museums can protect their assets from ownership 
claims with statutes of limitations and laches defenses, which grow stronger 
with the passage of time. On the other hand, professional codes of con-
duct encourage museums to work with heirs when there is a claim of own-
ership to find a mutually agreeable solution. This Note argues that because 
museum trustees are given discretion, it is reasonable to follow profes-
sional ethical guidelines and thus fulfill their duty of care. When the own-
ership claim is valid, museums should follow the ethical guidelines and 
work with the heirs to find an amenable solution. When the ownership 
claim is invalid, however, museums are under no ethical obligation to 
forego litigation and work with the heirs. If museums decide to pursue liti-
gation when the claim is valid, though, then that behavior is unethical. 
Introduction 
 It is estimated that between 1938 and 1945, the Nazis looted be-
tween one-fourth and one-third of Europe’s art.1 Although pillaging 
during war is common, the Nazis instituted a systematic, official policy 
to encourage it.2 Their purpose was two-fold: to repatriate German art 
and put that “worthy” European art in a museum in Adolph Hitler’s 
hometown of Linz, Austria, and to use “degenerate” works as bargain-
ing pieces to trade for art deemed worthy of possession.3 This policy, 
                                                                                                                      
1 David Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, a Picasso, & a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to Re-
cover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol’y 39, 40 (2004). 
2 Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance and Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes: Recovery of Art 
Looted During the Holocaust, 14 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 243, 243–44 (2006). 
3 See Wissbroecker, supra note 1, at 40–41; Sue Choi, Comment, The Legal Landscape of 
the International Art Market After Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 
167, 168 (2005). Artists that the Nazis supported included Vermeer, Rembrandt, Van Eyck, 
and Dürer, whereas degenerate art included the artists Van Gogh, Chagall, and Picasso, as 
well as any art that depicted Jews or criticized Germany. Choi, supra, at 168. 
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one of many ways the Nazis disenfranchised and persecuted the Jews,4 
resulted in laws that enabled the government to confiscate art collec-
tions of German and Austrian Jews.5
 By the time the Allies were approaching, the Nazis had hidden the 
stolen works in places such as castles and mines.6 Because of this wide-
spread dispersal of art, as well as its misclassification, improper storage, 
and subsequent looting by soldiers on both sides, the Allied forces 
failed to recover many works.7 Additionally, the Soviet Union had an 
official policy of keeping what they discovered, thus adding to the prob-
lem of dispossession.8 Only half of the looted art has been returned to 
the original owners or their heirs,9 and more than 100,000 works of art 
stolen by the Nazis are still missing.10
 The stolen art is a symbol of Nazi destruction; thus, beyond vindi-
cating property rights, recovering these objects is an equally powerful 
act of justice.11 Over the past ten years, international governments and 
museums have increasingly recognized the need to return wrongly 
taken cultural property to its rightful owners.12
 There are often two innocent victims in cases of Nazi-looted art: 
the original owner, or the original owner’s heirs, and the good faith 
purchaser.13 Original owners can assert legal claims of ownership and 
                                                                                                                      
4 Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to Resolve Disputes Re-
lating to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War II, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & 
Pol’y 27, 30 (1999). 
5 Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt 
an International Resolution to Nazi-looted Art Claims, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 193, 196 (2006). 
6 Id. at 197. 
7 Alexis Derrossett, Note, The Final Solution: Making Title Insurance Mandatory for Art 
Sold in Auction Houses and Displayed in Museums That Is Likely to Be Holocaust-looted Art, 9 T.M. 
Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L. 223, 231 (2007); Pollock, supra note 5, at 197–98. 
8 Laura Fielder Redman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using a “Shield” Statute as a 
“Sword” for Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction in Art and Antiquities Cases, 31 Fordham Int’l L.J. 
781, 783 (2008). 
9 Choi, supra note 3, at 170. 
10 Kaye, supra note 2, at 244. American and Russian soldiers also contributed to the 
theft of art during this time. Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws 
in Litigation Between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 Duke L.J. 955, 
960 & n.19 (2001) (pointing to the thefts by American soldiers in DeWeerth v. Baldinger and 
by American occupation forces in Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon). 
11 Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 
34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 165 (2000) (citing Eric Gibson, De Gustibus: The Delicate Art of Decid-
ing Whose Art It Is, Wall St. J., July 16, 1999, at W11). 
12 See Kaye, supra note 2, at 244. 
13 E.g., Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Be-
tween the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 
49, 51 (1995); Reyhan, supra note 10, at 961. 
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good faith purchasers can assert affirmative defenses.14 Good faith pur-
chasers risk loss of their artwork if their affirmative defenses fail.15 
When the good faith purchaser is a museum, its fiduciary duties poten-
tially conflict with its ethical responsibilities to deal with a Nazi-looted 
art claim.16 On one hand, fiduciary duties encourage the museum to 
maintain trust assets and thus not return the artwork.17 On the other 
hand, ethical responsibilities encourage the museum to work with the 
heirs to restitute artwork taken illegally.18 Bernd Neumann, Germany’s 
Federal Commissioner for Culture, summarizes the museums’ di-
lemma: 
It’s understandable that [museum directors] would like to 
keep their collections as complete as possible. They’ve re-
stored their pieces and cared for them over the decades. They 
want to have something to offer the public. But their behavior 
stands in contradiction to the moral responsibility that we 
have, which is without doubt more important.19
This Note addresses this conflict faced by museums and argues that 
when ethical responsibilities are viewed as informing the fiduciary duty, 
museums can fulfill both obligations simultaneously.20
 Part I provides an introduction to the legal claims of heirs who 
seek to recover art seized by Nazis, and reviews the factual issues they 
must prove and their various causes of action.21 Part II explains how 
                                                                                                                      
14 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2006); 
Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (Sup. Ct. 
2002). 
15 See, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980); Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 229 (1965). 
16 Compare Unif. Trust Code § 811 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 608 (2000) (calling 
for the defense of claims against the trust), and 3 Austin Wakeman Scott et al., Scott 
and Ascher on Trusts § 17.10 (5th ed. 2007) (same), with Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., 
Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art During the Nazi/World 
War II Era (1933–1945) §§ II.D, II.E (1998), available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/ 
guideln.php[hereinafter Task Force Report] (calling on museums and their trustees to 
resolve claims equitably). 
17 See, e.g., Unif. Trust Code § 809, 7C U.L.A. 606 (control and protection of trust 
property). 
18 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.D, II.E. 
19 There’s No Point Trying to Duck, Spiegel Online Int’l, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www. 
spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,594232,00.html. 
20 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 87 (2007); Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisi-
tion and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the 
Public, 11 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 409, 444 n.151 (2003); see also infra notes 290–352 
and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 26–60 and accompanying text. 
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museums are frequently protected from heirs’ claims because of stat-
utes of limitations and the defense of laches.22 Part III discusses muse-
ums’ fiduciary obligations and how duties of loyalty and care interact 
with the acquisition and deaccession of art, potentially further encour-
aging museums to rely on strong or absolute defenses.23 Part IV de-
scribes the apparent conflict between museums’ use of legal defenses to 
maintain possession of stolen artwork and their ethical responsibilities 
promulgated by national and international organizations.24 Finally, Part 
V looks at the discretion of museums and suggests that this discretion 
allows them to satisfy their fiduciary duties by following ethical consid-
erations, in an effort to show museums how to proceed when faced 
with Nazi-looted art.25
I. Legal Claims of the Heirs 
 Holocaust-era art restitution remained slow for about 40 years, but 
recently increased with renewed interest on the part of heirs seeking to 
reclaim their family’s art.26 Several factors have increased the number 
of claims of Nazi-looted art: heightened scholarly and journalistic in-
terest, declassification of war documents (especially after the Cold 
War), technological advances, and increases in art prices.27
 Litigation regarding Nazi-looted art is often complex and expen-
sive.28 Because of these burdens, parties often decide to settle.29 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
22 See infra notes 61–162 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 163–229 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 230–289 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 290–352 and accompanying text. 
26 Derrossett supra note 7, at 232. See generally Hector Feliciano, The Lost Museum: 
The Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World’s Greatest Works of Art (1997) (tracking 
the Nazi theft of five art collections); Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate 
of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (1994) (ac-
counting the looting of art in Europe during World War II and efforts to recover the lost 
items). 
27 Redman, supra note 8, at 784–85; Derrossett, supra note 7, at 232–33. 
28 See Bazyler, supra note 11, at 183. United States v. Portrait of Wally is often used as an 
example of how drawn-out and complicated these cases can be: the case originated in 1998 
and is still undecided while the painting remains in U.S. custody. See 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 
246 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining the procedural history in an opinion and order denying 
motions for summary judgment and ordering a trial); Kaye, supra note 2, at 261; Shira T. 
Shapiro, Note, How Republic of Austria v. Altmann and United States v. Portrait of Wally 
Relay the Past and Forecast the Future of Nazi Looted-Art Restitution Litigation, 34 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 1147, 1159 (2008). 
29 See Bazyler, supra note 11, at 166, 171; Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case Summary: 
Goodman and Gutmann v. Searle, http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1179627363 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter IFAR Goodman case summary]. Goodman v. Searle was 
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facts of the dispute between Thomas Bennigson and Marilynn Alsdorf 
over a Pablo Picasso painting stolen during World War II are explained 
by a 2004 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois deci-
sion.30 As will be seen throughout the remainder of this section, this 
dispute illustrates how heirs get involved, what heirs must do before 
bringing a claim, and what they pursue once they decide to litigate.31
A. What Heirs Must Do 
 Heirs wishing to litigate looted artwork claims have three core 
concerns: locating the artwork, establishing the right to make a claim, 
and overcoming difficulties created by the passage of time.32
1. Locating Artwork 
 Growing public interest in Nazi-looted art, along with newly re-
leased records and documents, have helped bring stolen artwork to 
light.33 Additionally, online databases prove to be a useful source for 
finding stolen works.34 In Alsdorf v. Bennigson, the Art Loss Register 
(“ALR”) discovered that the Germans stole the disputed Picasso paint-
ing and notified the original owner’s heir.35
2. Establishing Rightful Ownership 
 After locating the artwork, parties must prove legal standing to as-
sert a claim against the current possessor.36 As the years pass, it is in-
creasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the original owners of the 
                                                                                                                      
the first case involving Nazi-looted art to reach trial. Bazyler, supra note 11, at 166. On the eve of 
trial, the case ultimately settled with the parties agreeing to share ownership of the painting; the 
current possessor donated his one-half interest to the Art Institute of Chicago and the Art Insti-
tute purchased the remaining one-half interest from the heirs. Id. at 170. The next case involv-
ing Nazi-looted art to reach litigation was Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum. 42 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1031 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Bazyler, supra note 11, at 171. After the museum received 
verification that the Nazis stole the art from Paul Rosenberg, the museum agreed to return 
the painting to the Rosenberg family. Bazyler, supra note 11, at 174. 
30 See Alsdorf v. Bennigson, No. 04 C 5953, 2004 WL 2806301, at *1–*3, *11 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 3, 2004). 
31 See Alsdorf, 2004 WL 2806301, at *1–*3. 
32 Kaye, supra note 2, at 252; Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering Nazi-Looted Art: Report from 
the Front Lines, 16 Conn. J. Int’l L. 297, 299 (2001). 
33 Kaye, supra note 2, at 255–56. 
34 Kiesha Minyard, Note, Adding Tools to the Arsenal: Options for Restitution from the Inter-
mediary Seller and Recovery for Good-Faith Possessors of Nazi-Looted Art, 43 Tex. Int’l L.J. 115, 
117 (2007). Common examples are the Art Loss Register and museums’ own websites. Id. 
35 2004 WL 2806301, at *1–*2. 
36 See Kaye, supra note 2, at 256. 
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painting to bring these claims because the owners are simply too old or 
no longer living.37 Consequently, claims are brought by more-distant 
heirs who are less likely to have direct knowledge of the painting.38 This 
lack of close contact with the disputed artwork may lead to innocent 
mistakes in identification: aesthetically similar paintings may be con-
fused, and in fact, no claim may exist at all.39 Heirs may use family re-
cords, photos, insurance policies, and government records to establish 
a rightful claim.40
 In Alsdorf, ALR established the ownership by Carlota Landsberg 
with evidence that she was compensated for the loss of the painting at 
the hands of the Nazis in 1969 (on the condition that such payment 
would not alter her right to claim the painting if it were later lo-
cated).41 Additionally, ALR found a letter from art dealer Justin 
Thannhauser to Landsberg saying the Picasso painting that she en-
trusted to his care was stolen in 1940.42 It also found a picture of the 
painting in Thannhauser’s apartment and another photograph of the 
painting with the words “Stolen by the Germans” and “Carlota Lands-
berg” written on the back.43
 It is a well-established tenet of property common law that a thief 
can never obtain or convey good title.44 This is true even if a good faith 
purchaser subsequently purchases the stolen property.45 The true 
owner of stolen Nazi art commonly faces a good faith purchaser in the 
battle over who is the rightful owner.46 In order to prevail against a 
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See Shirley Foster, Prudent Provenance—Looking Your Gift Horse in the Mouth, 8 UCLA 
Ent. L. Rev. 143, 163 (2001). 
40 Kaye, supra note 2, at 256. 
41 2004 WL 2806301, at *2. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at *1. 
44 E.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 
804, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 229 (1965). 
45 E.g., Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C. 1971) ( “[A] possessor of 
stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired, can never convey good title.”). A good 
faith purchaser is one who buys without notice of facts that would encourage an ordinarily 
prudent person to inquire about the seller’s title. 77 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d Proof of a 
Claim Involving Stolen Art or Antiquities § 2 (2008). 
46 See Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 2. Various heirs of the original owner 
may also battle each other for ownership. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 
9940(MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002). 
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good faith purchaser, a true owner must prove both ownership and 
theft.47
3. Overcoming Difficulties Created by the Passage of Time 
 Once heirs prove their ownership right to the painting, they are in 
a stronger legal position than the good faith purchaser who possesses a 
stolen painting.48 This superior position, though, may not be asserted if 
barred by the statute of limitations or laches.49
 The passage of time is a major problem in restitution cases.50 Not 
only does it highlight the issue of statute of limitations and the defense 
of laches, but it can also make the heirs’ search to establish ownership 
more difficult.51 More than 60 years after the end of World War II, 
fewer and fewer generations of witnesses are accessible, making oral 
history and evidence further removed and potentially less credible.52
B. Causes of Action 
 Once heirs have evidence that proves rightful ownership, generally 
they will bring a cause of action for replevin or conversion.53 In the Als-
dorf case, the heir retained counsel and brought an action for replevin 
after settlement negotiations failed.54
 Replevin is an action to repossess personal property taken wrong-
fully.55 Before a claim for replevin arises, the person seeking reposses-
                                                                                                                      
47 Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for Repose 
in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes: Creation of an International Tribunal, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 155, 200 
(2007). In this situation, the original owner of a piece of art can recover it even if it has 
exchanged hands many times—because it was originally stolen. Derrossett, supra note 7, at 
237. 
48 Reyhan, supra note 10, at 969. 
49 See id. Part II offers an in-depth treatment of these defenses. See infra notes 61–162 
and accompanying text. 
50 See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1174. 
51 See Kreder, supra note 47, at 199; Derrossett, supra note 7, at 241. 
52 See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1174–75. 
53 See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman 
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 290–91 (7th Cir. 1990); Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage 
Warehouse, Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 806. 
54 2004 WL 2806301, at *3. Ultimately, this case did settle: Alsdorf paid $6.5 million to 
the heir in order to have clear title to the painting. Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case 
Summary: Bennigson v. Alsdorf; Alsdorf v. Bennigson; United States v. One Oil Painting 
Entitled Femme En Blanc by Pablo Picasso, http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid= 
1183048498 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
55 Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300, 306 (D.R.I. 2007), aff’d, 548 F.3d 50 
(1st Cir. 2008); Black’s Law Dictionary 1325 (8th ed. 2004). 
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sion must first make a demand on the good faith purchaser to return 
the property in dispute, which the purchaser must then refuse.56 In 
summary, for a valid cause of action of replevin, heirs must prove own-
ership, right to possession, detention by the defendant, demand and 
refusal, and damages.57
 Another common cause of action for owners dispossessed of art is 
conversion, which allows them to recover the equivalent monetary 
value of the work.58 Conversion is an action that requires plaintiffs to 
prove a right to possess the property at the time of conversion, the de-
fendants acted wrongly or disposed of the plaintiffs’ property right, and 
the plaintiffs suffered damages.59 Because what is considered conver-
sion is often in dispute, it is unlikely a court will resolve this cause of 
action through summary judgment.60
II. Status of the Law Protecting Museums 
 When museums are faced with a claim by an heir to Nazi-era 
looted art, they most often utilize the affirmative defenses of statute of 
limitations and laches.61 The success of these defenses, even in cases 
not involving museums, demonstrates how the passage of time works 
increasingly to protect a good faith purchaser.62
                                                                                                                      
56 66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin § 1 (2001); Barbara J. Tyler, The Stolen Museum: Have United 
States Art Museums Become Inadvertent Fences for Stolen Art Works Looted by the Nazis in World 
War II?, 30 Rutgers L.J. 441, 456–57 (1999). 
57 E.g., Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290 (plaintiff must establish right to possession, the 
unlawful detention of the property, and the wrongful possession of the property by the 
defendant); Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 42. 
58 Patty Gerstenblith, Art, Cultural Heritage, and the Law: Cases and Materi-
als 422 (2d ed. 2008); Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 26; see Portrait of Wally, 
2002 WL 553532, at *23. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines conversion as “an inten-
tional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the 
right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full 
value of the chattel.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965). 
59 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 42; see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 222A, 237, 244. 
60 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 26. 
61 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2006); 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991). 
62 See, e.g., Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 31, 2007); Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 
295, 296 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
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A. Statute of Limitations 
 The passing of the statute of limitations is crucial when dealing 
with Nazi-era stolen artwork because U.S. common law does not allow 
good title to pass to stolen works of art until the statute of limitations 
on the initial theft expires.63 Because the original owner can prevail on 
a claim if theft is shown, the good faith purchaser is only protected if 
the statute of limitations bars the claim.64
 There are competing interests at stake in having a statute of limita-
tions.65 A statute of limitations gives heirs time to reclaim their art, en-
couraging people to come forward with claims before “evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”66 But 
another purpose of the statute of limitations is to give a good faith pur-
chaser some repose.67 Fairness dictates that good faith purchasers need 
not worry indefinitely that original owners will come along to reclaim 
their art.68 Additionally, statutes of limitations promote judicial econ-
omy and encourage timeliness if suits are brought.69
 The time in which one can bring a claim for a stolen work starts to 
run when the cause of action accrues.70 There are generally two options 
as to when the statute of limitations begins to run depending on 
whether the state adheres to a “discovery rule” or a “demand and refusal 
rule.”71 As will be seen in several case examples, museums and individu-
                                                                                                                      
63 Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A Proposed Solu-
tion to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 15, 16 (1998); see, e.g., Toledo Museum of 
Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 806. 
64 Kreder, supra note 47, at 200. In contrast to the American approach, civil law nations 
tend to favor the good faith purchaser. Id. 
65 See, e.g., Stephen E. Weil, The American Legal Response to the Problem of Holocaust Art, 4 
Art Antiquity & L. 285, 291 (1999). 
66 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944); 
Weil, supra note 65, at 291. 
67 See Weil, supra note 65, at 291. 
68 See id. 
69 Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 Yale 
L.J. 2437, 2455 (1994). In the art context, there is a further concern for the viability of title 
and stability of the art market. E.g., Reyhan, supra note 10, at 1028. 
70 E.g., Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1136 (2d Cir. 1991); Lerner, supra 
note 63, at 18. 
71 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 29. These rules help to mitigate some of 
the harshness towards the original owner which occurs when the statute of limitations 
begins to run, or accrue, when the possessor acquires stolen property. See Lerner, supra 
note 63, at 19–20. 
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als holding stolen artwork have used statutes of limitations with great 
effectiveness to maintain ownership.72
1. Discovery Rule 
 Most states follow a “discovery rule,” which means that the statute 
of limitations begins to run once the true owner knows or should know 
the correct person or institution to sue, that is, the current possessor of 
the art.73 In 1980, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in O’Keeffe v. 
Snyder that the discovery rule applies to an action for replevin of a 
painting.74 The paintings at issue were allegedly stolen from Georgia 
O’Keeffe in 1946.75 When she learned of their whereabouts in 1976, 
she demanded their return.76 Using the discovery rule, the court found 
that O’Keeffe’s cause of action accrued “when she first knew, or rea-
sonably should have known through the exercise of due diligence, of 
the cause of action, including the identity of the possessor of the paint-
ings.”77 The court remanded the case to determine if O’Keeffe exer-
cised due diligence in her search for the paintings.78
 Courts can look at several factors to determine if the original 
owner can rely on the discovery rule, such as whether there were ways 
to notify the art world of the theft, and ways in which a purchaser would 
know the art had been stolen.79 Essentially, though, this rule requires 
                                                                                                                      
 
72 See, e.g., Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 2007); Toledo Museum of Art, 477 
F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
73 E.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980); Kreder, supra note 47, at 199. 
74 416 A.2d at 870. 
75 Id. at 865. 
76 Id. at 866. 
77 Id. at 870; see Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & 
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 281, 288–90 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that an action 
by the Republic of Cyprus and Church of Cyprus to recover stolen mosaics was timely un-
der the discovery rule because the Republic of Cyprus exercised due diligence by contact-
ing international organizations, scholars, museums, collectors, and more, and its cause of 
action did not accrue until it learned of the mosaics’ location). When determining when 
the owner should know who possesses the stolen painting, courts seem to give weight to 
the specific resources of the owner, such as those of a museum or art collector versus an 
average individual. Erisoty v. Rizik, No. Civ. A. 93-6215, 1995 WL 91406, at *13–*14 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 23, 1995); Reyhan, supra note 10, at 993. Additionally, the recovery efforts do not 
have to be exhaustive, but reasonable. See Erisoty, 1995 WL 91406, at *14. 
78 O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870. 
79 Id. Other factors include: 
(1) the nature of the injury; (2) the availability and quality of witnesses and 
physical evidence; (3) the lapse of time since the initial wrongful act; (4) 
whether the circumstances permit the inference that the delay has been in-
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original owners to pursue their missing work diligently.80 The rule is an 
equitable consideration, promoting fairness between original owners 
and subsequent good faith purchasers, and lessening unjust results 
from a more strict application of the statute of limitations.81
2. Demand and Refusal Rule 
 The “demand and refusal” rule, followed in New York, states that 
the statute of limitations begins to run when the original owner de-
mands return of the artwork but is refused by the current possessor or 
good faith purchaser.82 In contrast to the discovery rule, application of 
this rule allows the original owner more time to find the good faith 
purchaser,83 and thus gives the original owner the most protection.84 In 
fact, some critics believe that the demand and refusal rule is like hav-
ing, effectively, no statute of limitations.85
 The Court of Appeals of New York adopted this rule in a 1991 de-
cision, Guggenheim v. Lubell.86 The Solomon R. Guggenheim Founda-
tion brought an action against a good faith purchaser to recover a Marc 
Chagall gouache allegedly stolen by a museum employee in the late 
1960s.87 The court rejected the good faith purchaser’s argument that 
because the museum did nothing to locate the gouache in the twenty 
years between its disappearance and the museum’s discovery of the 
gouache with the good faith purchaser, the museum’s claim was barred 
                                                                                                                      
tentional or deliberate; and (5) whether the delay has unusually prejudiced 
the defendant. 
Erisoty, 1995 WL 91406, at *12 (citing John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen 
Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1122, 1152 (1980)). 
80 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 29. The actual definition of due diligence 
will vary from case to case, taking into account the “nature and value” of the property. 
O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873. 
81 See O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869. 
82 Kreder, supra note 47, at 199; see, e.g., Golden Budha Corp., v. Canadian Land Co. of 
Am., 931 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1991); Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 427; Menzel v. List, 267 
N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
83 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 29. 
84 Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430. One of the justifications the court gives for a rule 
that is friendly towards original owners is New York’s cultural influence. See id. at 431. Ad-
ditionally, courts are aware that stolen art is extremely difficult to recover and the original 
owners, already suffering because of their lost art, should not have the burden of proving 
ownership. Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at 1137–38. 
85 Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 51–52 (arguing that the Guggenheim v. Lubell deci-
sion does not give enough weight to the value of repose given that two innocent parties, 
the theft victim and purchaser, are often involved). 
86 569 N.E.2d at 427. 
87 Id. 
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by the three-year statute of limitations.88 Instead, the court held that 
“the timing of the museum’s demand for the gouache and the appel-
lant’s refusal to return it are the only relevant factors in assessing the 
merits of the Statute of Limitations defense.”89 No kind of due dili-
gence on the part of the original owner is required.90 The court fa-
vored the “clarity and predictability” of the demand and refusal rule.91
3. Successful Application of Statutes of Limitations 
 Despite the balance achieved by imposing a statute of limitations, 
some legal scholars and law students believe that courts should suspend 
the statute of limitations in Holocaust-looted art cases because of the 
unusually appalling context of the Holocaust.92 This is most likely be-
cause several looted art cases were determined solely on the basis of 
statute of limitations grounds.93
 Two recent cases involve a dispute between the heirs of Martha 
Nathan, and the Toledo Museum of Art and the Detroit Institute of 
Arts.94 The paintings in dispute originated from the same sale by the 
                                                                                                                      
88 Id. at 428–29. 
89 Id. at 427. 
90 Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at 1138; Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430. The court does not impose 
a reasonable diligence requirement because it is concerned that an owner would be “un-
duly burden[ed]” because of the numerous facts that affect an owner’s search, such as the 
value of the property stolen and the institution that held the property. Guggenheim, 569 
N.E.2d at 431. Rather, the issue of reasonable diligence could be utilized in the context of 
a laches defense. Id.; see Republic of Turk. v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46–47 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s complaint of plaintiff’s delay in bringing a 
claim went solely to the issue of laches and not a statute of limitations defense). 
91 Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 427. 
92 See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 444; Lerner, supra note 63, at 15; Stephanie 
Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on Claims for Nazi-
Looted Art, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 447, 450–61 (1999); see also Bibas, supra note 69, 
at 2439 (proposing, in art theft cases and not necessarily in the Nazi-looting context, that 
statutes of limitations should not apply when original owners report the theft to the police 
and a theft database). 
93 See, e.g., Orkin, 487 F.3d at 742 (holding that original owner’s claim was barred by 
statute of limitations because even under the most generous standard of accrual for the 
cause of action, the claim expired by 1993, applying the three-year statute of limitations in 
1990, the date of the last public announcement of the good faith purchaser’s ownership); 
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that original owner’s 
claim of ownership was barred by statute of limitations). Bibas observes that courts have 
lessened the impact of statutes of limitations in ways favoring original owners, but in the 
fifteen years since his note was published, the passage of time leans more favorably towards 
the good faith purchaser. See Bibas, supra note 69, at 2449. 
94 See Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802. 
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original owner of a collection of artwork.95 Both museums believed the 
paintings were sold in a valid sale.96 The heirs refused to concede that 
Nathan “sold” the paintings in 1938 after fleeing the Nazis because 
there was not enough evidence as to the terms of the purchase.97
 In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
held in Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin that the heirs of Martha Nathan 
had no property claim to the paintings because the statute of limita-
tions expired.98 The court used the discovery rule to determine when 
the statute of limitations began to accrue.99 Because the original owner 
herself failed to bring a claim for the painting during her lifetime, her 
estate made no claim, and because of the increased public attention 
regarding Nazi-looted art in the late 1990s, her heirs should have made 
an inquiry into the painting well before filing their action in 2006, and 
therefore the heirs’ claim was time-barred by Ohio’s four-year statute of 
limitations.100
 Similarly, in 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan held in Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin that the statute of limita-
tions barred the heirs’ claims of ownership.101 The court did not apply 
the discovery rule and so the counterclaims began to accrue when the 
wrong, out of which the counterclaims arose, took place—when the 
original owner sold the painting in 1938.102 Michigan’s three-year stat-
ute of limitations barred the heirs’ claims.103
                                                                                                                      
95 See Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 
at 804. 
96 See Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 
at 804–05. 
97 Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 n.3; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 
at 804 & n.1. 
98 477 F. Supp. 2d at 809. The original owner’s heirs asserted a claim of ownership 
against the Toledo Museum of Art (“TMA”) in May 2004 and the museum rejected the 
ownership claims in 2005 after providing the heirs with the painting’s provenance infor-
mation. Id. at 805. TMA sought declaratory judgment in January 2006 to quiet title. Id. In 
response, the heirs brought counterclaims for conversion, restitution, and declaratory 
judgment. Id. TMA moved to dismiss the heirs’ counterclaim. Id. at 806. 
99 See id. at 806–07. 
100 Id. at 803, 807–08. 
101 2007 WL 1016996, at *4. In early 2006, the Detroit Institute of Arts (“DIA”) re-
quested declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at *1. The heirs then filed counterclaims for 
declaratory judgment, restitution, and conversion and DIA brought a motion to dismiss 
those counterclaims. Id. 
102 Id. at *2–*3. The court went further and found that even if they used the discovery 
rule, the heirs should have discovered they had a cause of action in 1973, when the estate 
made additional claims for wartime losses, that would also be barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations. Id. at *3. 
103 Id. at *3. 
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 In both cases the courts did not address the issue of whether a 
“sale” occurred because it was irrelevant to the statute of limitations 
analysis.104 Because of the application of each state’s statute of limita-
tions, the issue of whether the sale was forced or voluntary remained 
unresolved and the paintings stayed with the museums.105
B. Laches 
 Although both the discovery and demand and refusal rules can be 
seen as overly harsh towards good faith purchasers, a laches defense 
can lessen the severe result.106 Like the statute of limitations defense, 
laches is an affirmative defense,107 but unlike application of the statute 
of limitations, laches is not binding on courts.108 A laches defense could 
bar a claim that would otherwise be valid under the statute of limita-
tions.109 The laches defense requires a showing that the plaintiff’s un-
reasonable delay in bringing a claim prejudiced the defendant.110
 Proving both facts—unreasonable delay and prejudice—can place 
a heavy evidentiary burden on the good faith purchaser.111 A case with 
a laches defense is very fact-specific, which means it is time-consuming 
to research.112 Therefore, it is difficult to resolve a case with a laches 
                                                                                                                      
104 See id. at *4; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804 n.1. This same issue was 
also left unresolved in Orkin v. Taylor when the court did not settle the dispute between the 
parties over whether the painting was effectively confiscated by the Nazis through a forced 
sale or was sold legitimately, because the heirs’ claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 487 F.3d at 738, 741. 
105 See Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 n.3, *4; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. 
Supp. 2d at 809; Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Declaratory Judgment Actions as to Art Displaced Dur-
ing the Holocaust, Art & Cultural Heritage L. Newsl., Summer 2008, at 14, 14. 
106 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 29. One scholar characterizes laches as 
“the equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations.” Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due 
Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to Valuable Artwork, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 631, 697 
(2000). 
107 Lerner, supra note 63, at 25 n.34. 
108 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 8 (2000). Instead, the court will balance the 
equities of each side. Id. 
109 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 45, § 32. 
110 E.g., Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008); Robins Island Pres. 
Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 423 (2d Cir. 1992); Derrossett, supra note 
7, at 241. This involves weighing the interests of the good faith purchaser and the original 
owner’s diligence in pursuing the claim. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. 
Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 WL 673347, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) 
(citation omitted)). Critics of this rule argue that the flexibility of determining these as-
pects achieves individual justice, but at the expense of guidance because parties have no 
direction about what they should do. Bibas, supra note 69, at 2458. 
111 Lerner, supra note 63, at 27. 
112 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 443. 
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defense through a motion to dismiss or summary judgment because 
facts are often in dispute.113 Using this defense effectively means that 
litigation will be drawn-out and costly.114
1. Unreasonable Delay Element 
 In determining if there was unreasonable delay in bringing a claim 
involving disputed ownership of art, courts focus on the plaintiffs’ dili-
gence from the time of the theft, rather than the actual length of the 
delay.115 When original owners do not exhibit diligence, laches may 
extinguish their ownership rights.116 Because of this focus on diligence, 
it is not clear as to how long is too long to allow a claim to prevail.117 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, though, clearly stated that ex-
treme examples, such as a delay of 200 years, are certainly too long.118 
Also, because of the focus on diligence, this aspect is especially fact-
sensitive and can be difficult to determine.119
 The plaintiffs’ diligence is a factor in a laches defense.120 For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its 1982 decision, 
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, affirmed the district court’s find-
ing that the original owner of two Albrecht Dürer portraits used rea-
sonable diligence in locating the stolen paintings held by a good faith 
                                                                                                                      
113 See id.; see also Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037(WHP), 2006 WL 2311113, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006) (denying summary judgment based on a laches defense where 
there were issues of material fact regarding the length of delay, whether such delay was 
excusable, and the prejudice to the good faith purchaser); Republic of Turk., 762 F. Supp. at 
47 (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of mate-
rial fact regarding defendant’s prejudice existed). But cf. Vineberg, 548 F.3d at 57 (affirming 
grant of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion because lack of prejudice to the defendant 
was clear). 
114 Lerner, supra note 63, at 28. 
115 E.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d on other 
grounds, 38 F.3d. 1266 (2d Cir. 1994); Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 67; see, e.g., Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate, 1999 WL 673347, at *10. 
116 Phelan, supra note 106, at 701. 
117 See Foster, supra note 39, at 154. Foster points to the example of New Jersey v. New 
York, where the U.S. Supreme Court found that a delay of 103 years did not prejudice the 
defendant. 523 U.S. 767, 769 (1998); Foster, supra note 39, at 154. 
118 See Robins Island, 959 F.2d at 424. 
119 See DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 553 (noting that in 1987 the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York found that plaintiff did not unreasonably delay in bringing 
a claim, whereas when the case was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, that 
court came to the opposite conclusion). 
120 Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 67. When examining diligence, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals looked to factors such as publicizing the loss of and continuously search-
ing for the painting. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111–12 (examining diligence in the mistaken 
context of a statute of limitations defense instead of laches). 
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purchaser.121 Examples of this diligence included reporting the paint-
ings as missing, engaging in numerous correspondences with museum 
officials, and informing military agencies of the theft until discovering 
the painting in 1966.122
 In contrast, in 1987 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in 
DeWeerth v. Baldinger that the original owner unreasonably delayed 
bringing a claim because her efforts to locate her painting, allegedly 
stolen during World War II, and her claim of ownership in 1982 were 
not diligent.123 In examining delay, the plaintiffs’ actions and available 
measures are important.124 For example, the court in DeWeerth noted 
that the original owner was aware of several programs designed to lo-
cate art lost during World War II, but did not take advantage of those 
programs.125 Also important are plaintiffs’ inactions: what they failed to 
do.126 For example, in DeWeerth, the court found that the original 
owner’s failure to consult the Catalogue Raisonné (a definitive collection 
of an artist’s works) was particularly inexcusable, given that her 
nephew, after consulting the Catalogue Raisonné, identified her missing 
painting within three days.127 The original owner’s failure to search for 
the painting for 24 years was most indicative of her lack of diligence.128
2. Prejudice Element 
 Prejudice generally consists of the loss of evidence, such as wit-
nesses and documents (evidence-based prejudice), or a material 
change in the defendant’s position (expectations-based prejudice).129 
Common examples of prejudice are loss of evidence and important 
witnesses, sale of the disputed property for fair market value to a good 
faith purchaser, or use of resources in reliance upon the state of affairs 
                                                                                                                      
121 678 F.2d 1150, 1152, 1165 (2d Cir. 1982). 
122 Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 850–51 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981), aff’d 678 F.2d at 1150. 
123 See 836 F.2d at 107, 111. 
124 Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 67; see also DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112. 
125 836 F.2d at 111. 
126 Id. at 111–12; see also Werthheimer, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (holding that failing to take 
steps to recover the allegedly stolen painting for nearly half a century, including making 
inquiries when the painting appeared in an advertisement for sale in the city in which the 
original owner lived, exhibited the family’s lack of due diligence). 
127 See 836 F.2d at 112. 
128 Id. 
129 E.g., Vineberg, 548 F.3d at 57; Robins Island, 959 F.2d at 424; Hawkins et al., supra 
note 13, at 67–68. 
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that existed before knowledge of the theft.130 Merely pointing to the 
passage of time as being prejudicial is not enough.131
 In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in 
Vineberg v. Bissonnette that a laches defense was not viable because the 
defendant did not show adequate prejudice.132 There, the current pos-
sessor inherited a Franz Xaver Winterhalter painting from her mother 
in 1991 which her stepfather purchased in a forced sale by the Nazis in 
1937.133 The current possessor claimed she was prejudiced because po-
tential evidence and witnesses were likely unavailable at this late date, 
although she did not elaborate on the types of evidence she was miss-
ing.134 Considering the defendant’s evidence-based contention for 
prejudice, the court rejected her claim and found, in dicta, that merely 
pointing to “potential witnesses and evidence” is not the same as identi-
fying “particular witnesses . . . [and] documents,” or the nature of such 
witnesses and documents, that were not available because of the pas-
sage of time.135 Not only must defendants show with particularity the 
evidence that was lost, but also how that evidence would aid in their 
defense over a contested issue.136
 When looking at expectations-based prejudice, the courts will con-
sider if defendants suffered from a material change in position137 or 
suffered because they believed they acquired good title.138 The emo-
tional pain resulting from losing a painting, though, is not enough to 
show prejudice.139 Likewise, in 1991 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                      
130 See Vineberg, 548 F.3d at 57. 
131 See id. at 58. 
132 Id. The court also identifies this case as involving “evidence-based” prejudice rather 
than “expectations-based” prejudice. Id. at 57. 
133 Id. at 53–54. 
134 Id. at 57. 
135 Id. at 57–58. 
136 See Vineberg, 548 F.3d at 58. The court found fault in the fact that the defendant was 
alleging evidence-based prejudice even though there was no contested issue that such evi-
dence would have helped to resolve. Id. 
137 DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 553; Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 67. 
138 Phelan, supra note 106, at 706; see also Wertheimer, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (holding that 
the current possessor was prejudiced by the lack of due diligence because it was “virtually 
impossible for [the current possessor] to prove that any of its predecessors in interest ac-
quired good title”). Another example of this type of prejudice is found in the real estate 
context in Robins Island, in which the court held that a cause of action for ejectment was 
barred by laches because the delay of 200 years made it impossible to know “whether title 
would have changed hands if this action had been timely brought,” and thus the defen-
dant suffered prejudice because it is unlikely it “would have purchased the property had it 
known its title was in dispute.” 959 F.2d at 424. 
139 See DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 554. 
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peals in Hoelzer v. City of Stamford stated in dicta that the current posses-
sor, an art restorer who started to restore a set of Works Progress Ad-
ministration murals after the murals were inadvertently discarded from 
a public high school, would not establish prejudice necessary for a la-
ches defense because he paid nothing for the murals and would instead 
receive a “windfall” if the court granted him title.140
3. Application of Laches 
 Although the courts acknowledge that questions of fact typically 
arising in a laches defense are generally resolved at trial, there are sev-
eral examples where courts have found sufficient unreasonable delay 
and/or prejudice to grant motions for summary judgment.141
 In 2002, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in 
Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., affirmed the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as 
barred by the doctrine of laches.142 The original owner of a painting 
whose ownership was in dispute did not exercise diligence in searching 
for the painting following its alleged misappropriation and sale by the 
person to whom the owner entrusted it when the family fled the Na-
zis.143 Because the family did not take any steps to recover the painting 
after 1960, the court held that the current possessor was prejudiced by 
not being able to prove its predecessors had good title.144
 In Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1999 granted 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.145 Although the court 
determined that French law applied to the action, in dicta the court 
found that if New York law applied, laches would bar the original 
owner’s claim.146 The court found that the original owner did not exer-
                                                                                                                      
140 933 F.2d at 1133, 1138. 
141 E.g., Robins Island, 959 F.2d at 424–25 (affirming the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of current possessor because action barred by statute of limitations and laches); Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate, 1999 WL 673347, at *9 (noting that “[i]n some cases, however, the 
record is sufficiently clear on summary judgment to establish whether or not a particular 
search was diligent”); In re Peters, 821 N.Y.S.2d 61, 69 (App. Div. 2006) (noting that lack of 
diligence and prejudice may be resolved as a matter of law when apparent); cf. Vineberg, 
548 F.3d at 59 (affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of original owner be-
cause laches defense was deficient). 
142 752 N.Y.S.2d at 296–97. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 1999 WL 673347, at *1. 
146 Id. at *6–*7. 
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cise due diligence in searching for the Archimedes Palimpsest in the 
early part of the twentieth century because it did not even know the 
Palimpsest went missing.147 There was little evidence surrounding the 
good faith purchase: no documents existed showing the transfer of ti-
tle.148 The current possessor was prejudiced by the delay in action be-
cause the critical witness (the one who purchased the Palimpsest) was 
deceased and key documents were missing, as expected over the course 
of the seventy-year delay.149
 In 2006, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in In re 
Peters, reversed a decision to allow pre-action discovery because the ac-
tion was not meritorious and, in the alternative, was barred by either 
statute of limitations or laches.150 When the original owner fled the Na-
zis, he left the painting in dispute with his brother, who later sold it 
without the owner’s consent.151 After unsuccessful negotiations in the 
mid-1930s to repurchase the painting, the family did not assert any 
claims of ownership or make additional demands on those holding it, 
even though the painting was exhibited at prominent museums.152 The 
court furthermore held that the current possessor was prejudiced by 
this delay because it could not establish good title, given that none of 
the individuals involved in the original sale were alive.153
C. Recent Developments Show How Law Is Favorable to Good Faith Purchasers 
 It is easy to see that museums have strong defenses to claims by 
original owners or heirs.154 As time progresses, it will become easier to 
                                                                                                                      
 
147 Id. at *10. The court also criticized the Patriarchate’s excuse that, as an order of 
monks, they should not be expected to search for a missing painting. Id. The fact that the 
Patriarchate retained counsel to prevent the Christie’s auction of the Palimpsest showed 
they could have obtained help to search for the Palimpsest. Id.; see also DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 
112 (noting that plaintiff appeared to be “a wealthy and sophisticated art collector” who 
could have retained someone to search for her painting). 
148 Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, 1999 WL 673347, at *2. 
149 Id. at *10. 
150 821 N.Y.S.2d at 63, 69. 
151 Id. at 63. 
152 Id. at 66, 68. 
153 Id. at 69. 
154 See, e.g., Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *4; Wertheimer, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 296–
97. In a concurring opinion, Justice Newman in Hoelzer highlights an interesting paradox: 
Museums in possession of stolen art will probably think it preferable to fash-
ion rules that place some obligation on owners to act with diligence in seek-
ing to locate works they claim were stolen from them. On the other hand, 
museums that are victims of theft [such as in Guggenheim] will probably think 
492 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:473 
prove that the plaintiff delayed in bringing the suit and that prejudice 
exists because witnesses and documents are gone.155 As a result, if mu-
seums raise these defenses, the likelihood of winning increases with 
time.156
 Museums recognize the strength of these defenses and are begin-
ning to initiate litigation when an heir surfaces with a claim to artwork 
in the museum’s collection.157 Museums are filing declaratory judg-
ment actions to settle legal title and preemptively defeat any claims an 
heir might have.158
 The first two cases in which museums filed declaratory judgment 
actions were both decided in favor of the museums because the statute 
of limitations expired for the heirs.159 More recently, to settle title to an 
Oskar Kokoschka painting, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, brought 
suit against Dr. Claudia Seger-Thomschitz, an heir of the disputed 
painting’s original owner.160 The court also decided in favor of the mu-
seum because the statute of limitations expired.161 Additionally, both 
the Museum of Modern Art and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Founda-
tion brought suit against Julius H. Schoeps to settle title to two Pablo 
Picasso paintings, but the case settled before reaching trial.162
                                                                                                                      
it preferable to have rules that minimize the obligation of owners to locate 
their stolen property. 
933 F.2d at 1139 (Newman, J., concurring). 
155 Alexandra Minkovich, Note, The Successful Use of Laches in World War II-Era Art Theft 
Disputes: It’s Only a Matter of Time, 27 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 349, 351 (2004). 
156 See id. 
157 See Kreder, supra note 105, at 14. 
158 Id. (contending that these declaratory judgment actions are at the “forefront of 
Holocaust-era litigation”). 
159 See Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *4; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 
at 809. 
160 Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, No. 08 Civ. 10097 (RWZ), slip op. at 1 (D. 
Mass. May 28, 2009); Kreder, supra note 105, at 17; Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, Mu-
seum of Fine Arts, Boston, Asserts Rightful Ownership of Kokoschka Painting, Two Nudes 
(Lovers) 1 ( Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.org/dynamic/sub/ctr_link_url_ 5980. 
pdf. Seger-Thomschitz made a claim of restitution in March 2007 after which the museum 
researched the painting’s provenance. Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, supra, at 3; see also 
Museum of Fine Arts, No. 08 Civ. 10097 (RWZ), at 8. In January 2008, the Museum of Fine Arts 
(“MFA”) filed a declaratory judgment action to quiet title. Museum of Fine Arts, No. 08 Civ. 
10097 (RWZ), at 8; Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, supra, at 1. 
161 Museum of Fine Arts, No. 08 Civ. 10097 (RWZ), at 20. 
162 See Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Randy Kennedy, Museums, Heirs Settle Dispute over Picasso, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2009, at C2, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/arts/design/03arts-MUSEUMSHEIRS_ 
BRF.html?ref=nyregion. 
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III. Fiduciary Obligations in Acquiring and Restituting Art 
 As seen in Part II, good faith purchasers can utilize affirmative de-
fenses to defeat claims of ownership by original owners or heirs.163 
These claims of ownership can be and are brought against museums.164 
Museums serve important roles as educators and preservers, acquiring, 
protecting, researching, and exhibiting historical and cultural ob-
jects.165 Although some museums are organized as charitable trusts, 
most incorporate as non-profit corporations qualifying as public benefit 
or charitable organizations.166 Over the years, the museum’s purpose 
has broadened to include cultural sensitivity, reflected in the manner of 
acquisition, preservation, and restitution of cultural artifacts.167
 Fiduciary obligations arise from museums’ statuses as charitable 
trusts or non-profit corporations.168 Museum managers are trustees and 
thus are subject to the fiduciary duties common to all public and chari-
table trusts.169 Unlike traditional private trusts, the beneficiaries of mu-
seum trusts are not specific individuals, but the general public.170 This 
is because of the elements of public support and public benefit func-
tioning in a museum.171 A fiduciary’s basic duties consist of loyalty and 
care.172
                                                                                                                      
163 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2006); 
Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (Sup. Ct. 
2002); see also supra notes 61–162 and accompanying text. 
164 E.g., Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 803; Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 
42 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031–32 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
165 Patty Gerstenblith, The Fiduciary Duties of Museum Trustees, 8 Colum.-VLA J.L. & 
Arts 175, 176 (1983); see Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 414. 
166 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 413 (qualifying as public benefit or charitable or-
ganizations because of the museum’s educational purposes); Jennifer L. White, Note, When 
It’s OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of 
Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1041, 1048, 1050 (1996). 
167 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 451–52. 
168 Daniel Range, Comment, Deaccessioning and Its Costs in the Holocaust Art Context: The 
United States and Great Britain, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 655, 657 (2004); White, supra note 166, at 
1051. 
169 Gerstenblith, supra note 165, at 176–77. For the purposes of this Note, the trustee 
fiduciary standard will be used, so museum management, although possibly titled as a 
director, shall be referred to as a trustee. See, e.g., Unif. Trust Code § 804 (amended 
2005), 7C U.L.A. 601 (2000); see also infra note 173. 
170 Gerstenblith, supra note 165, at 177; Range, supra note 168, at 657. 
171 See Gerstenblith, supra note 165, at 180. 
172 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 416; White, supra note 166, at 1051. 
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 The duty of loyalty is complete loyalty towards the beneficiary.173 
Both the public beneficiaries and the trust terms deserve loyalty.174 In 
exercising the duty of care, the trustee standard is employing care that 
ordinarily prudent persons would use in handling their own prop-
erty.175 A trustee must maintain trust assets.176 The duty of care involves 
attention to museum management, such as preservation of both the 
physical assets, like the actual collections and the building, as well as 
monetary assets.177
 Museums must grapple with the duties of loyalty and care in many 
different contexts: when making decisions regarding the acquisition 
and deaccession of works and assessing the potential to pursue litiga-
tion to clarify title to disputed works.178
                                                                                                                      
173 E.g., Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735, 740 (2d Cir. 1978); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior”); Scott and Ascher on Trusts, su-
pra note 16, § 17.2; White, supra note 166, at 1052. See generally Victor Brudney, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595, 601–07 (1997) (providing an overview 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty). There is some debate of whether to use a trust or corpo-
rate standard when defining the duties of loyalty and care. See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, 
at 417; White, supra note 166, at 1049–58 (explaining the differences between the two 
standards and advocating that a trust standard be applied towards museum actions). Be-
cause a trust standard is more demanding than a corporate standard, this Note utilizes 
trustee fiduciary duties regardless of whether a museum is organized as a charitable trust 
or non-profit corporation. See, e.g., Unif. Trust Code § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601; White, supra 
note 166, at 1055. 
174 Gerstenblith, supra note 165, at 180. Discussing loyalty towards the trust, in 1960 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation held that a cause 
of action existed because a charitable organization could not completely shut out the pub-
lic on the whim of the trustees in violation of the agreement between the donor and the 
foundation. 159 A.2d 500, 504–05 (Pa. 1960). 
175 E.g., In re Clark’s Will, 177 N.E. 397, 398 (N.Y. 1931) (stating that a trustee must 
“employ such diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as in general, 
prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, employ in their own like af-
fairs”) (quoting King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 85–86 (1869)); In re Detre’s Estate, 117 A. 54, 57 
(Pa. 1922) (stating that a trustee is “not liable when he acts in good faith as others do with 
their own property”); Unif. Trust Code § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601 (“A trustee shall administer 
the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional 
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.”); Phelan, supra note 106, at 677; 
White, supra note 166, at 1053. 
176 E.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003); Un-
if. Trust Code § 809, 7C U.L.A. 606 (trustee has a duty to use reasonable care and skill to 
preserve the trust property). 
177 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 416–17; White, supra note 166, at 1052–53. 
178 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 420. 
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A. Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care in Acquiring Art  
and the Risk That Works Are Stolen 
 Sometimes a museum will unknowingly purchase a stolen work of 
art.179 It can also acquire works through a donation or by bequest from 
a good faith purchaser.180 When a work is donated, a museum may be 
less likely to investigate the work’s provenance, not wanting to “look a 
gift horse in the mouth,” and it may unknowingly acquire a stolen 
work.181 When a work is acquired through a good faith purchase, a mu-
seum may not obtain good title if the work was stolen, in which case the 
museum must return it to its original owner.182
 In acquiring works and dealing with the risk of stolen artwork, mu-
seums must fulfill their duty of care.183 In a situation regarding the ac-
quisition of trust property analogous to the problem faced by museums 
in negligently acquiring stolen artwork, the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
in 1984, in In re Estate of Dwight, found that a trustee violated his duty of 
care when he purchased land without first properly inspecting the 
property.184 There, the trustee did not question the tenant of the land 
about the condition of the building, which had a leaking roof, sagging 
support beams, bad electrical wiring, and other defects.185 The trustee 
purchased the property without having a structural inspection or de-
termining if the building passed health, safety, and fire code require-
ments.186 Such lack of action, the court found, did not comport with 
the duty of care used by a prudent person.187
 In the museum context, obtaining a work through a less-than-
diligent process, negligently disregarding undocumented or gap-filled 
                                                                                                                      
179 See Lauren McBrayer, The Art of Deaccession: An Ethical Perspective, in ALI-ABA, 
Course of Study: Legal Problems of Museum Administration Mar. 30–Apr. 1, 2005, 
at 339, 351 (2005). 
180 Id. 
181 See id. at 355. 
182 Id. at 351–52. A museum can obtain good title, though, if affirmative defenses can 
be successfully mounted. See Kreder, supra note 47, at 200; Derrossett, supra note 7, at 241. 
183 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 420, 441; see also Unif. Prudent Investor Act 
§ 2(d), 7B U.L.A. 20 (1994) (“A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts rele-
vant to the investment and management of trust assets.”). 
184 See 681 P.2d 563, 567 (Haw. 1984); see also In re Estate of Collins, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644, 
648 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that trustees “failed to follow the ‘prudent investor’ stan-
dard, first, by investing two-thirds of the trust principal in a single investment, second, by 
investing in real property secured only by a second deed of trust, and third, by making that 
investment without adequate investigation of either the borrowers or the collateral”). 
185 In re Estate of Dwight, 681 P.2d at 567. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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provenance, and thus subjecting the museum to a potential restitution 
in the future is a violation of the duty of care.188 The penalty for 
breaching the duty of care is the deaccession cost associated with re-
turning the work to its rightful owners.189
 A poorly obtained acquisition can have undesirable consequences 
for a museum.190 An example of this can be seen in the contest that 
developed between the Seattle Art Museum (“SAM”) and the 
Rosenberg family over an Henri Matisse painting the museum received 
by bequest but without adequate investigation.191 The Rosenberg family 
asserted that the Nazis stole the painting during World War II.192 Set-
tlement negotiations stalled and the heirs sued SAM.193 When SAM’s 
own research, though, indicated that the painting was stolen, SAM re-
turned the painting to the heirs.194 If better standards are in place at 
the acquisition stage, it is less likely museums will acquire stolen art, 
thus later avoiding deaccessioning and breaching a fiduciary duty.195
B. Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care in Deciding to Deaccession 
 In deaccessioning a work, where museums remove artwork from 
their collections, museums may act voluntarily or involuntarily, depend-
                                                                                                                      
188 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 411, 452–53, 457; Phelan, supra note 106, at 675. 
Museums are becoming increasingly aware of the risks posed by poor acquisition policies, 
as evidenced in the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s Collections Management Policy, which 
has a section devoted to Nazi/World War II Era guidelines for researching provenance. 
Metro. Museum of Art, Collections Management Policy 6 § IV.D.2 (Nov. 2008). The 
Policy states that additional research should be undertaken if provenance information is 
incomplete, such information should be made public, and any claims that arise should be 
reviewed “promptly and responsibly” and resolved in an “equitable, appropriate and mu-
tually agreeable manner.” Id. § IV.D.2.a–c. 
189 See Range, supra note 168, at 672. 
190 See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 409–11 (explaining how the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art purchased the “Lydian Hoard” for $1.2 million knowing that the objects 
were stolen, and later returned the objects to the Republic of Turkey once Turkey brought 
a suit in federal district court). 
191 See Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case Summary: Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum v. 
Knoedler-Modarco, Inc., http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1184701032 (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter IFAR SAM case summary]. 
192 Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1031. 
193 IFAR SAM case summary, supra note 191. 
194 Id. SAM initiated suit against the gallery from which the donor purchased the 
painting in the 1950s, alleging it misrepresented the provenance of the painting to the 
donors. See Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–32, 1037. This case also settled with the gal-
lery compensating SAM for its legal fees and the loss of the painting to the heirs. IFAR 
SAM case summary, supra note 191. 
195 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 465. 
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ing on the context.196 For example, the law might compel the deacces-
sioning of a work because the museum does not have legal title.197 Ad-
ditionally, although deaccessioning a work may technically be volun-
tary, in reality it may merely be done to settle a lawsuit without further 
litigation.198 And in another context, a museum may truly return 
looted art voluntarily, without any threat of a lawsuit.199 When deciding 
to deaccession, museum trustees must keep in mind the public’s bene-
fit of acquired art and take into account the duty of loyalty, the poten-
tial breach of the duty of care if museum assets are disrupted, and the 
financial burdens accompanied with both deaccessioning and choosing 
not to deaccession.200
 Museum trustees owe a duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiary, the 
public.201 Because deaccessioning works often removes them from the 
public domain, deaccessioning may conflict with a museum’s duty of 
loyalty to the trust beneficiaries.202 More people would benefit if the 
work stayed in the museum, rather than being held privately.203 The 
risk of museums breaching their duty of loyalty greatly increases if the 
public opposes the deaccesion because museums could disenfranchise 
their beneficiaries.204 Furthermore, if the public is displeased with the 
deaccession, the museum could receive bad publicity, resulting in lower 
attendance or fewer bequests.205 In the context of Nazi-looted art how-
ever, the public is often in favor of deaccessioning art stolen during the 
Holocaust.206 The trustees have to weigh the gain in public sentiment 
against the loss of a painting that benefits the public.207
                                                                                                                      
196 See id. at 425. 
197 See id. at 425, 436. 
198 Id. at 425. 
199 Id. at 450–51 (explaining how the Getty Museum returned looted antiquities to It-
aly voluntarily, without the threat of a lawsuit, after receiving documentation of rightful 
ownership). 
200 See id. at 441; Range, supra note 168, at 672. 
201 Gerstenblith, supra note 165, at 177; Range, supra note 168, at 657; see In re Estate of 
Gump, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 287 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that trustee violated duty of loy-
alty when it threatened to charge an audit only to beneficiaries that objected to its ac-
count, in an effort to get them to drop their objections). 
202 See McBrayer, supra note 179, at 341. Additionally, removing a work can ruin a col-
lection and the work is often irreplaceable. Phelan, supra note 106, at 668. 
203 McBrayer, supra note 179, at 358; see Foster, supra note 39, at 147. 
204 See Range, supra note 168, at 658. 
205 Id. at 672. 
206 Id. at 665. 
207 See Foster, supra note 39, at 147; Range, supra note 168, at 672. Perhaps the greater 
common good would be served if the museum abides by established property laws and 
returns a work to which it never had good title. See Foster, supra note 39, at 147–48. 
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 When a museum decides to restitute a work of art, it may also vio-
late its duty of care to preserve museum assets.208 Museums breach their 
duty of care during a deaccession because trust property, a work in its 
collection, is removed209 and museum resources are used to facilitate 
the deaccession.210 For example, in order to pay a confidential settle-
ment to an heir claiming ownership of a stolen painting in the Metro-
politan Museum of Art’s collection, the museum consigned the painting 
to auction.211 Because the museum sold trust property and used pro-
ceeds from the sale to fund the deaccession-related costs, it arguably 
breached its duty of care to preserve museum assets.212
 Despite the potential for public goodwill through restitution, the 
museum must also consider the financial burden of deaccessioning in 
the form of provenance research and potential litigation.213 There is 
also the huge financial loss of the painting itself, a cost that not even 
public goodwill may be able to match.214 For example, when the Kim-
bell Art Museum in Fort Worth, Texas, decided to deaccession a paint-
ing after learning it was illegally seized during World War II, the mu-
seum later repurchased the painting for $5.7 million when the heirs 
put the painting up for auction.215 It appears that the museum heavily 
valued the ethics of their decision to return the artwork to the heirs.216
                                                                                                                      
 
208 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 411, 441. One could also argue that in refusing to 
deaccession a stolen work, museums breach a duty of care by keeping an inappropriate 
investment. See 4 Scott and Ascher on Trusts, supra note 16, § 19.4; see also Pub. Serv. 
Co. of Colo. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 577 F. Supp. 92, 104–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding 
that the trustee inadequately monitored the investment and did not discover that the in-
vestment was unsuitable for the trust; thus, failure to rid the trust of the investment was a 
breach of duty to dispose of the investment in a proper amount of time). 
209 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 411; see Gerstenblith, supra note 165, at 193. Usually 
a piece of art will be housed in the museum for decades, becoming a part of its identity. 
McBrayer, supra note 179, at 358. 
210 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 420, 443. 
211 Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case Summary: Metropolitan Museum of Art Settles 
Heir’s Claim to Monet, http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1179703220 (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter IFAR Met Monet case summary]. 
212 See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 441; IFAR Met Monet case summary, supra 
note 211. 
213 Range, supra note 168, at 665. 
214 See id. 
215 Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case Summary: Kimbell Art Museum Return of 
Turner Painting to Jaffé Heirs, http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1186675435 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
216 See Michael Granberry, Kimbell Reacquires Disputed Turner Painting, Guide Live, Apr. 
20, 2007, http://www.guidelive.com/sharedcontent/dws/ent/visualarts/stories/DN-kim- 
bell_0420gl.ART0.State.Edition1.4337838.html. The director of the museum said that mu-
seum officials 
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C. Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care in Deciding to Litigate 
 Museums are also faced with the formidable task of assessing the 
unique facts of each case before deciding whether to settle a claim or 
face litigation.217 Fiduciaries have a duty to defend actions that could 
result in the loss of trust property.218 In this context, this generally 
means going to court.219
 According to trust law, though, a museum may properly settle a 
claim, instead of pursuing litigation, if a reasonably prudent person 
under the circumstances would also settle.220 An example of such a rea-
sonable decision was found in Selleck v. Hawley, where in 1932 the Su-
preme Court of Missouri’s dicta indicated that the trustee would not be 
punished for paying a debatable tax instead of going to trial to dispute 
the tax’s validity, because it would have cost more money to litigate 
than to pay the tax.221 Even if a museum determines that either the af-
firmative defenses of statute of limitations or laches can be used, the 
time needed to mount those defenses would use up museum re-
sources.222 At such a point, the museum may decide that the cost to 
litigate, both monetary and in the form of public goodwill, is too great 
to proceed.223
                                                                                                                      
 
made no attempt to resist returning the work. It was clear that this was the 
morally correct thing to do. Having said that, it did leave a hole in our collec-
tion. But with today’s events [re-purchasing the painting at auction], we’re 
able to close that circle and bring it back to the Kimbell. 
Id. 
217 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 441 (illustrating that museums’ choice to settle a 
claim or pursue litigation can be especially scrutinized if the restitution occurs without 
litigation or a court order, or if the museum proceeds to restitute when a legal defense is 
available). 
218 Unif. Trust Code § 811 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 608 (2000); see Metzenbaum 
v. Metzenbaum, 252 P.2d 31, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (holding that trial court erred in re-
fusing trustee reimbursement for attorneys’ fees because of trustee duty to “defen[d] 
against adverse claims to trust assets”). 
219 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805 (examining museum that 
brought action to quiet title to painting after heirs brought a claim of ownership); Rosen-
berg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–32 (examining heirs who brought action against a museum to 
compel the painting’s return; museum filed third-party complaint against gallery from 
which donors purchased painting). 
220 Scott and Ascher on Trusts, supra note 16, § 17.10 (stating that trustees can pay 
a claim, even if they do not believe it is well founded, if it is reasonable); see, e.g., Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts, § 87 (2007). 
221 56 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Mo. 1932). 
222 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 443. 
223 See id. Two attorneys involved in Nazi-looted art disputes stated: 
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 The dispute between the Wadsworth Atheneum Museum of Art, in 
Hartford, Connecticut, and the Italian government is an example of 
how the decision not to litigate could be reasonable and even advanta-
geous for trust beneficiaries.224 The contention centered on a painting 
stolen by Russian troops in 1945 and purchased by the Atheneum in 
1965.225 In 1997 the Atheneum concluded that the painting was sto-
len.226 Italy claimed ownership of the painting, and although the 
Atheneum could have raised a statute of limitations defense, it decided 
instead to return the painting and avoid litigation.227 The painting was 
valued at $500,000 to $700,000, but in exchange for returning the paint-
ing, the Atheneum received the works of several Italian masters on loan, 
with the Italian government providing the transportation and insurance 
costs worth approximately $350,000.228 The public benefitted from this 
access to works outside the museum’s permanent collection.229
IV. Professional Responsibilities 
 When public awareness of Nazi-looted art increased during the 
late 1990s, Congress considered enacting legislation to set standards for 
returning stolen art.230 Museum directors, however, testified that they 
could better handle the subject themselves, resulting in codes of ethics 
promulgated by the Association of Art Museum Directors and the 
American Association of Museums, discussed below.231 This climate of 
                                                                                                                      
 
In . . . negotiations, we aim to convince the defendant gallery . . . of the value 
of settling without having to endure the cost and negative publicity of being 
sued as the holder[] of Holocaust Art and as the possessor[] of stolen prop-
erty seized at the behest of the Nazi authorities. 
Donald S. Burris & E. Randol Schoenberg, Reflections on Litigating Holocaust Stolen Art Cases, 
38 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1041, 1049 (2005). 
224 See Unif. Trust Code § 811 cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 608 (2000) (noting it 
may be proper for the trustee to compromise or settle an action depending on the chance 
of recovery and the cost of enforcing the suit); Scott and Ascher on Trusts, supra note 
16, § 18.1.6 (“[I]f it is reasonable to compromise a claim, the trustee may properly do 
so.”). 
225 Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case Summary: Italy and Wadsworth Atheneum Agree 
on Return of Zucchi Painting, http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1184707993 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter IFAR Wadsworth Atheneum case summary]. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 See id. 
230 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 437. 
231 Id. For example, when Congresswoman Maloney asked Glenn Lowry, Director of 
the Museum of Modern Art, if he saw government in the process of dealing with these 
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awareness also produced international efforts to deal with stolen art 
claims.232
 These codes of professional responsibility do not advise outright 
that museums should return artwork seized by Nazi forces.233 Instead, 
the codes state that disputes should be resolved equitably, but the con-
cerns for research and transparency in the collections seem to point 
towards returning the paintings to their rightful owners.234
A. Association of Art Museum Directors 
 The Association of Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”) was founded 
in 1916 to help establish and maintain professional standards for mu-
seums and their directors.235 In 1998, the AAMD Task Force on the 
Spoliation of Art During the Nazi/World War II Era (1933–1945) re-
leased a report on its findings, which purports to reconcile the interests 
of heirs with museums’ fiduciary and legal duties.236
 The Task Force Report urges extensive provenance research for 
works with suspicious gaps in provenance, even before claims are 
brought against museums, with the resulting information disseminated 
                                                                                                                      
claims, he replied that “there are a number of different interested parties, from museums 
to groups like the World Jewish Congress. And I think, at least from the point of view of 
museums, it is going to be an issue that we need to think through thoroughly.” The Restitu-
tion of Art Objects Seized by the Nazis from Holocaust Victims and Insurance Claims of Certain Holo-
caust Victims and Their Heirs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 
105th Cong. 30 (1998). Additionally, Lowry said that “I am convinced the [Association of 
Art Museum Directors’] task force will provide the kinds of guidelines and recommended 
actions necessary to ensure that America’s museums set the standard for ethical behavior 
in this respect.” Id. at 11. 
232 See, e.g., Commission for Looted Art in Europe, Vilnius Forum Declaration (2000), 
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/vilnius-forum (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Vilnius Declaration]; Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, 1998 Wash. 
Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets Proc. app. G ¶¶ 1–11, at 971–72, available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocaust/heacappen.pdf [hereinafter Washing-
ton Principles]. 
233 See Task Force Report, supra note 16; Am. Ass’n of Museums, Guidelines Concern-
ing the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, (1999, amended 2001), 
http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/upload/ethicsguidelines_naziera.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
234 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.C.1 II.E.2 (recommending muse-
ums offer to resolve these matters in an equitable manner and facilitate access to informa-
tion on works with World War II-era provenance); Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6, 7 (rec-
ommending museums resolve the matter in an equitable manner and make available to 
the public information regarding provenance research). 
235 Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., About AAMD, http://www.aamd.org/about/ (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2010). 
236 Kreder, supra note 47, at 167; Task Force Report, supra note 16, § II. 
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to the public.237 The Report further encourages museums to resolve 
matters in an equitable and agreeable manner and urges member mu-
seums to work with the claimants to settle claims through mediation.238 
A prompt and cooperative response, as encouraged by the Task Force 
Report, could greatly satisfy heirs who may then work with the museum 
to let it keep the artwork.239 For example, in 2000, the North Carolina 
Museum of Art voluntarily returned a painting to the heirs of the origi-
nal owner after their provenance research verified the heirs’ claim.240 
The heirs were so pleased with the museum’s response that they de-
cided to sell the painting back to the museum below its market price.241
 In a paper discussing a museum’s choice to deaccession, the AAMD 
encourages the museum to take into account any new evidence indicat-
ing that a painting was stolen or illegally exported or imported.242 
AAMD also recommends museums consider whether the deaccession 
best maximizes benefit to the museum and the public and whether the 
item has historical or cultural significance to the city in which the mu-
seum is located.243 AAMD recognizes, though, that the answers to these 
types of queries are unique to each museum.244
 More recently, in May 2007, the AAMD issued a paper with ques-
tions that serve as a checklist for museums to ensure they are continu-
ing the diligent work in researching provenance and responding to 
claims.245 Among the questions on the checklist are, “[i]s the museum 
updating its provenance research to the best of its ability as new infor-
mation becomes available,” “[h]as the museum made public the results 
                                                                                                                      
237 See Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.A, II.B, II.C, add. 
238 See id. §§ II.D, II.E. Specifically, museums are encouraged to review claims “promptly 
and thoroughly,” resolve a claim “in an equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable man-
ner,” and “consider using mediation wherever reasonably practical.” Id. §§ II.E.1, II.D.2, 
II.E.3. 
239 See Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 451. 
240 Spiegler, supra note 32, at 297 & n.2. 
241 See id. at 297. 
242 See Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., Art Museums and the Practice of Deaccessioning 2 
(Nov. 2007) (position paper) available at http://www.aamd.org/papers [hereinafter AAMD 
Deaccessioning Paper]. 
243 Id. at 3. For example, in a dispute over six Gustav Klimt paintings, the Austrians of-
ten referred to the Klimts as their Mona Lisa, and that seems to have heightened the hostil-
ity towards the original owner’s heir attempting to regain the paintings before turning to 
U.S. litigation. See Kreder, supra note 47, at 193–94. 
244 AAMD Deaccessioning Paper, supra note 242, at 3. 
245 See Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., Art Museums and the Identification and Restitution 
of Works Stolen by the Nazis 2–3 (May 2007) (position paper, available at http://www.aa 
md.org/papers/documents/Nazi-lootedart_clean_06_2007.pdf [hereinafter AAMD Identi-
fication and Restitution Paper]. 
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of its provenance research, and is it continuing to do so,” and “[w]hat 
are the steps a museum should take in establishing whether a claim is 
legitimate?”246 The paper suggests the AAMD’s core values underlie the 
answers to the questions posed, which include fulfilling the mission of 
serving the public and maintaining high standards of “curatorial, pro-
fessional and ethical integrity.”247
B. International Agreement 
 The influence of the AAMD’s Task Force Report guidelines ex-
tended internationally.248 The first international effort to be influenced 
was the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, which at-
tempted to establish guidelines to generate research and resolve Nazi-
looted art claims fairly.249 The conference gathered forty-four nations 
and thirteen non-governmental organizations in late 1998.250
 The moral influences underlying this conference are evident 
throughout its eleven principles.251 The intent of the principles is to 
provide “just and fair” solutions to resolve ownership disputes regard-
ing Nazi-looted art.252 The principles do not directly target museums, 
and the main focus appears to be the claimants’ interest of rightful 
ownership, not the museums’ burdens of following the principles, such 
as the financial costs of additional provenance research, publicizing 
stolen art, and deaccessioning.253 To help claimants, nations are en-
couraged to create central registries of looted art, publicize art confis-
cated by the Nazis, make records accessible, and resolve any issues ex-
peditiously.254
 These efforts are only a representation of action because the con-
ference did not establish uniformity among nations, recognizing in-
stead that participating nations had to act within their own laws and 
legal systems.255 Additionally, the conference only stated guidelines that 
are not binding on nations.256
                                                                                                                      
 
246 Id. at 3. 
247 Id. at 3–4. 
248 See Kreder, supra note 47, at 169. 
249 Id. at 169–71; Washington Principles, supra note 232, ¶¶ 3, 9. 
250 J.D. Bindenagel, Message from the Editor, 1998 Wash. Conference on Holocaust-Era 
Assets Proc., available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocaust/heaca.pdf. 
251 See Washington Principles, supra note 232, ¶¶ 1–11. 
252 See id. ¶¶ 8, 9. 
253 See Range, supra note 168, at 668; Washington Principles, supra note 232, ¶¶ 1–11. 
254 Washington Principles, supra note 232, ¶¶ 6, 5, 2, 8, 9. 
255 Kreder, supra note 47, at 171; Washington Principles, supra note 232, at intro & ¶ 11 
(noting at the outset that “among participating nations there are differing legal systems” 
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 In an October 2000 effort, participating governments met for the 
Vilnius International Forum on Holocaust Era Looted Cultural Assets 
to build upon the principles set forth in the Washington Conference.257 
They did not, however, significantly refine or expand those princi-
ples.258 The forum did renew emphasis, though, on the need for the 
nations to determine how to implement the principles, especially the 
alternative dispute resolutions, and to do so in a timely manner.259
 Created in 1946 as a non-governmental organization, the Interna-
tional Council of Museums (“ICOM”) brings together museums and 
museum professionals to develop the “conservation, continuation and 
communication” of the world’s natural and cultural heritage.260 Its 
Code of Ethics, revised in 2004, does not explicitly address Nazi-looted 
art, but urges due diligence in determining provenance and cooperat-
ing promptly and responsibly if restitution is sought.261 In January 
1999, ICOM issued a series of recommendations for returning art con-
fiscated during World War II.262 The recommendations stress following 
“stringent ethical principles” while further researching and making ac-
cessible provenance and “actively address[ing] the return” of objects 
formerly owned by Jews, pursuant to national legislation.263
C. American Association of Museums 
 The American Association of Museums (“AAM”), established in 
1906, represents museums by developing industry standards, encourag-
ing the sharing of knowledge, and advocating for issues relevant to the 
museum community.264 The AAM promulgates a Code of Ethics for Mu-
                                                                                                                      
and later that “[n]ations are encouraged to develop national processes to implement these 
principles”). 
256 Derrossett, supra note 7, at 235. 
257 See Vilnius Declaration, supra note 232. 
258 Kreder, supra note 47, at 172; see Vilnius Declaration, supra note 232. 
259 Range, supra note 168, at 669; see Vilnius Declaration, supra note 232. The Vilnius 
Declaration also proposed periodic meetings of nations to continue dealing with efforts to 
restitute stolen art. Vilnius Declaration, supra note 232, ¶ 5. 
260 Int’l Council of Museums, ICOM Mission, http://icom.museum/mission.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
261 See Int’l Council of Museums, Code of Ethics, at ii, 3, 10 (2006), available at http:// 
icom.museum/code2006_eng.pdf. 
262 Press Release, Int’l Council of Museums, Recommendations Concerning the Re-
turn of Works of Art Belonging to Jewish Owners ( Jan. 14, 1999), available at http://icom. 
museum/worldwar2.html. 
263 Id. 
264 Am. Ass’n of Museums, About AAM, http://www.aam-us.org/aboutaam/index.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
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seums (“Code”).265 The Code acknowledges the guiding concept that 
museums share a commitment to serving the public.266 The AAM rec-
ommends that each member-museum adopt the Code in its own sepa-
rate code of ethics.267
 The Code stresses that the museum’s duty to the public is not to 
just act legally, but ethically as well.268 Serving as a public trust, a mu-
seum should respond to and represent the interests of the public.269 
The highest public trust is involved in collection stewardship and a mu-
seum must ensure that collections are lawfully held, documented, and 
accessible.270 If museums must dispose of a work, it must only be for the 
“advancement of the museum’s mission.”271 Additionally, “competing 
claims of ownership . . . should be handled openly, seriously, respon-
sively and with respect for the dignity of all parties involved.”272
 The AAM set forth its own Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful 
Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era (“Guidelines”) in 2001 
to help museums address problems of non-restituted art unlawfully ap-
propriated during the Nazi era.273 The Guidelines remind members 
that a museum’s collections are held in public trust and any steps to 
research provenance and possibly restitute disputed art must be done 
with the public trust in mind.274 Its broad goals ask museums to identify 
pieces in their collection that changed ownership between 1932 and 
1946, to make available to the public provenance information on such 
pieces, and to give this kind of research priority.275 To advance these 
goals, the AAM encouraged museums to “expand online access to col-
lection information.”276
 In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
in Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin highlights how museums have adhered 
to certain portions of the Guidelines.277 The Toledo Museum of Art 
                                                                                                                      
265 Am. Ass’n of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums (2000), http://www.aam-us. 
org/museumresources/ethics/coe.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Code of 
Ethics]. 
266 See id. 
267 Id. 
268 See id. 
269 Id. 
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271 Code of Ethics, supra note 265. 
272 Id. 
273 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 444; Guidelines, supra note 233, at 1–2. 
274 See Guidelines, supra note 233, at 7. 
275 Id. at 2–3. 
276 Id. at 3. 
277 See 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Guidelines, supra note 233, at 2–3. 
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(“TMA”) posted on its website, in accordance with the Guidelines’ sug-
gestion, artwork in its collection with a Nazi-era provenance.278 The 
heirs to a Paul Gauguin painting, allegedly sold under duress in 1938, 
saw the posting, recognized the lost painting, and contacted the mu-
seum.279
 TMA, however, did not continue to adhere to the Guidelines.280 
After gathering its own research, TMA did not decide to resolve the 
dispute through mediation and rejected the heir’s claim of ownership 
in an action seeking declaratory judgment.281 The Guidelines, in con-
trast, encourage museums to resolve disputes through mediation rather 
than litigation once a claim of disputed ownership is brought.282 Again 
not following the Guidelines’ suggestion, TMA asserted a statute of 
limitations defense in response to the heirs’ counterclaim for conver-
sion.283 The Guidelines suggest that in order to resolve claims in an 
“equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner,”284 the mu-
seum may choose to waive available defenses to reach such an “equita-
ble and appropriate resolution.”285
 The court in Toledo Museum of Art held that the Guidelines were 
not intended to be legal obligations or mandatory rules, but rather to 
facilitate museums’ ethical acts.286 The heirs argued that by posting the 
painting on its website, TMA adopted the Guidelines and thus invited 
the public to make claims and agreed to forego their statute of limita-
tions defense.287 The court held, however, that the museum did not 
waive its statute of limitations and laches defenses by adopting the AAM 
guidelines of posting information regarding artwork with Nazi-era 
                                                                                                                      
278 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
279 Id. at 803, 804 n.1, 805. 
280 See id. at 805; Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6–7. 
281 See Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805. According to the court’s opinion, 
TMA rejected the ownership claim because it was “without merit.” Id. at 808. It is unclear, 
though, whether TMA thought the claim was without merit because its provenance re-
search indicated the painting was not stolen but sold, or because the claim was barred by 
statute of limitations. See id. at 804 n.1, 808. 
282 Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6; see Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 445. Although 
the Guidelines do encourage museums to take steps like mediation, there is much latitude 
as to when museums should forego the litigation method. See Guidelines, supra note 233, 
at 6 (the Guidelines suggest a time “when appropriate and reasonably practical”). 
283 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
284 Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6. 
285 Id. at 7. 
286 477 F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
287 Id. at 808. 
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provenances.288 Although the museum complied with the suggestion to 
post artwork online, it did not waive its defenses as a result.289
V. Achieving Balance: Informed Duty of Care 
 Deaccessioning a work of art forces museum directors to find a 
balance between their legal, fiduciary, and ethical obligations.290 Mu-
seum fiduciaries must grapple with many factors, such as public reac-
tion and costs of litigation, as they decide how to proceed.291 Ulti-
mately, the museum trustee must struggle with what is in the best 
interest of the public and the museum.292 Fiduciary obligations gener-
ally do not lead to a clear answer of when to deaccession.293 Although 
trustees are instructed to preserve trust assets and defend against 
claims that could result in a loss of trust property, trustees may also set-
tle claims if it is reasonable.294
 Behind this conflict are the strong defenses of statute of limitations 
and laches that encourage museums to keep the artwork.295 Profes-
sional ethics, however, clearly indicate the opposite when faced with a 
legitimate claim by an heir, recommending foregoing technical de-
fenses and working with the heir to find an equitable solution.296
 Also relevant in this conflict is the trust standard of “abuse of dis-
cretion,” in which courts will generally defer to trustee decision if it 
                                                                                                                      
288 Id. at 809. 
289 Id.; see also Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *4 (E.D. 
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290 See Range, supra note 168, at 673. 
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2006). 
296 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.D, II.E; Guidelines, supra note 
233, at 6–7. 
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meets the reasonable prudent person standard.297 Because of the abuse 
of discretion doctrine, trustees can act within their discretion by adopt-
ing professional codes of conduct as a way to inform and fulfill their 
fiduciary duties.298 Although museums are exercising this discretion, 
recent examples of museums turning to litigation to maintain artwork 
show that they are still struggling with how to best proceed.299
A. Abuse of Discretion 
 A trustee has discretion in exercising fiduciary powers.300 This dis-
cretion is usually implicit in the terms of the trust, or can be explicitly 
stated.301 Courts will not interfere unless the trustees acted unreasona-
bly, as measured by a reasonable prudent person standard, or against 
their fiduciary duties.302 Examples of abuse of discretion include acting 
dishonestly, in bad faith, or with improper motive.303
 For example, the Court of Appeals of New York in a 1934 decision, 
City Bank Farmers’ Trust Company v. Smith, held that the dispute between 
a beneficiary and a trustee, regarding a discretionary action taken by 
the trustee, forms no basis for a declaratory judgment.304 This is be-
cause a trustee “assumes the responsibility of administering the trust 
                                                                                                                      
297 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, §§ 77, 87 (2007); see also Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts, § 87 cmt. c (stating whether “the trustee’s decision is one that would not be 
accepted as reasonable by persons of prudence”). 
298 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 87; Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 444 
n.151. 
299 See, e.g., Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); IFAR SAM case summary, supra note 191. 
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303 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 87 cmt. c; see, e.g., Blunt v. Kelly, 131 F.2d 632, 
634 (3d Cir. 1942) (stating trustee bound to act in good faith); Budreau v. Mingledorff, 63 
S.E.2d 326, 333 (Ga. 1951) (holding court will not interfere with honest exercise of discre-
tion); George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees § 560 n.91 (rev. 2d ed. 1980) (explaining cases in which courts found an abuse 
of discretionary power). 
304 189 N.E. 222, 223 (N.Y.), aff’d 191 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1934). 
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with reasonable care” and the court does not ordinarily advise a trustee 
when the trustee has choices.305
B.Codes of Conduct Show That Trustees Do Not Abuse  
Their Discretion When Returning Artwork 
 Although professional codes of conduct, such as the AAM Guide-
lines, do not have legal effect, they can be useful in defining the duty of 
care and in establishing when museum trustees can be judged to fulfill 
their fiduciary obligations.306 By returning Nazi-looted art, the trustee 
comports with the duty of care established by the profession and thus 
acts reasonably, which means the trustee need not fear inviting court 
intervention.307 Museums are currently using this discretion and such 
use will solidify ethical obligations.308
1. Exercise of Discretion 
 It is ethically correct to settle ownership claims when those claims 
are valid.309 Museum trustees exercise their discretion in deciding to 
settle claims with Holocaust survivors and their heirs.310 As of 2002, one 
law firm compiled a list of claims made against U.S. museums involving 
Nazi-looted art: out of the twelve claims, four pieces were returned and 
the remaining eight stayed with the museum.311 In seven of those eight 
cases, museums kept the artwork after paying a monetary settlement.312
 Although some scholars raise concerns that such examples of resti-
tution or payment may mean a violation of the duty of care, these ex-
amples instead show how trustees follow professional guidelines and 
                                                                                                                      
305 Id.; see also Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 318, 322, 
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thus fulfill their duty of care.313 For example, when SAM decided to 
return Matisse’s Odalisque after conducting thorough provenance re-
search, its director announced: “By our action today, the Seattle Art 
Museum is drawing a clear ethical line. Since day one, SAM has been 
committed to doing the right thing.”314 Such a decision comports with 
AAMD Task Force Report guidelines, in that to “review such a claim 
promptly and thoroughly,” SAM contacted the Holocaust Art Restitu-
tion Project a few months after first receiving the heirs’ claim.315 By re-
turning the art to its rightful owner, SAM “resolve[d] the matter in an 
equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner” and thus rea-
sonably fulfilled its duty of care in its deaccession decision.316
 In examples where the museum retains the artwork, there are 
some creative settlements involving partial purchase by the museum 
and partial donation by the heir.317 Even in cases where the museums 
pay full price, it is still arguably within the proper duty of care. 318 For 
the Princeton University Art Museum, the decision to pay heirs the full 
market value of Bernardino Pinturicchio’s St. Bartholomew, was a happy 
collaboration of the museum’s desire to retain the painting because of 
its educational value as a teaching piece, and the heirs’ desire for the 
work to remain accessible to the public.319 This example highlights an-
other aspect of both the AAMD and AAM suggestions: resolving the 
                                                                                                                      
313 See id. at 441. 
314 Press Statement, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., SAM to Return Matisse Odalisque to 
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http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1184688280 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
319 Press Statement, Princeton Univ., Princeton University Art Museum Reaches Agree-
ment with Heirs of Owner of Painting Sold During World War II Era ( June 13, 2001), avail-
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ownership claims concerning World War II-era cultural property.” Id. 
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dispute in a mutually agreeable manner.320 Additionally, the parties 
sought resolution other than through litigation, another ethical en-
couragement.321
2. Ethical Obligations Will Be Solidified by Museum Deaccessioning 
 The ethics do have some gaps in guidance, which are vague and, as 
some scholars note, not successful.322 As seen in the May 2007 AAMD 
paper, the questions posed are more helpful in getting museums to 
think about their actions, and less helpful in providing actual guid-
ance.323 For example, the paper asks, “is the museum balancing a swift 
and compassionate response to claimants with its responsibility as an 
institution to act with care and prudence in protecting the works it 
holds in trust for the public?”324 This question seems to be the crux of 
the museum’s dilemma.325
 Before a museum can be confident that fulfillment of profes-
sional guidelines is an acceptable way to fulfill the duty of care, more 
museums need to work with the heirs to find an agreeable solution 
and set an example of complying with ethics.326 The North Carolina 
Museum of Art’s reaction to a claim regarding Madonna and Child in a 
Landscape, by Lucas Cranach the Elder, answers the above question in 
the affirmative.327 There, the museum decided to return the painting 
to the heirs, and the heirs were so pleased with the museum’s re-
sponse that they offered to sell it to the museum substantially below 
its estimated value and the painting remains on display in the mu-
seum.328 Such an example is illustrative to museums that find them-
selves asking the same question.329
                                                                                                                      
 
320 See Task Force Report, supra note 16, § II.D.2; Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6. 
321 Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6; see Task Force Report, supra note 16, § II.E.3. 
322 See Bazyler, supra note 11, at 185; see also McBrayer, supra note 179, at 353. 
323 See AAMD Identification and Restitution Paper, supra note 245. 
324 AAMD Identification and Restitution Paper, supra note 245, at 3. 
325 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 803; Unif. Trust Code § 809 
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 606 (2000); Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6–7. 
326 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 87 (2007); Gerstenblith, supra note 
20, at 444–45; IFAR SAM case summary, supra note 191; IFAR Wadsworth Atheneum case 
summary, supra note 225. 
327 See Int’l Found. for Art Research, Case Summary: Hainisch and North Carolina Mu-
seum of Art in Raleigh, North Carolina, http://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid= 
1184602007 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
328 Id. 
329 See id.; AAMD Identification and Restitution Paper, supra note 245, at 3. Additionally, 
the museum was thorough in its research into the claim, taking several months to investigate 
the claim and thus also fulfilling the duty of care by taking the time to pursue the provenance 
512 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:473 
C. Recent Aggressive Actions by Museums May Not Run Counter  
to Their Ethical Responsibilities 
 Museums are ethically compelled to settle claims of ownership 
when the claims are valid.330 When the claims are not valid, they are not 
ethically compelled to settle those claims and litigation may be an op-
tion.331 But when the museum pursues litigation when the claim is valid, 
that is unethical.332
 What about the recent cases of museums filing declaratory judg-
ment actions?333 Although ethical guidelines suggest a museum should 
forego defenses like statutes of limitations, this is not stopping those 
museums from initiating litigation and utilizing the statute of limita-
tions to keep disputed artwork.334 These examples could mean that 
museums are becoming hostile to heirs’ claims and are focusing on 
their fiduciary duty to preserve trust assets with the help of legal reme-
dies that are strongly in their favor.335 Such behavior would be unethi-
cal if the heirs’ claims are valid.336
 In the dispute over an Oskar Kokoschka painting between the Mu-
seum of Fine Arts, Boston (“MFA”) and the painting’s heir, the museum 
notes that after learning of the heir’s claim, it researched the painting’s 
provenance according to its own standard as well as the guidelines estab-
lished by AAM, AAMD, and the Washington Principles.337 After obtain-
ing that research, the MFA decided to file a declaratory judgment ac-
tion.338 If the MFA followed ethical guidelines in researching the claim, 
                                                                                                                      
research. See Yonat Shimron, A Madonna Stolen by Nazis Takes a Trip Home, News & Observer 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 1, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/news/story/ 
1315599.html; Task Force Report, supra note 16, § II.E; Guidelines, supra note 233, at 6. 
330 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, § II.D.2; IFAR Wadsworth Atheneum 
case summary, supra note 225. 
331 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.E.1–2; Guidelines, supra note 233, 
at 6. 
332 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.D, II.E; Guidelines, supra note 
233, at 6–7. 
333 E.g., Museum of Modern Art, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 544; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. 
Supp. 2d at 803, 809; see also supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
334 See, e.g., Museum of Modern Art, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 544; Guidelines, supra note 233, at 7. 
335 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 803, 809; Unif. Trust Code § 809 
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 606 (2000). 
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233, at 6–7. 
337 Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, supra note 160, at 3. 
338 Id. at 4. 
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but did not follow those guidelines in pursuing litigation, it could mean 
that the museum felt confident in an affirmative defense.339
 The MFA, however, pursued litigation because it believed the 
heir’s claim was meritless.340 The MFA’s research showed that the 1939 
sale of the painting by the original owner was voluntary, was sold with-
out Nazi coercion, and was not stolen by the Nazis.341 Because good 
title passed in that 1939 sale, the museum contends, they have rightful 
ownership.342 The MFA’s course of action in this dispute may be distin-
guished from other disputes in which a museum also brings legal ac-
tion, by the fact that the MFA, after researching the claim, believed it 
would not be an equitable solution to return a painting to heirs who 
have no legal right of ownership because the painting was never wrong-
fully taken during World War II.343
 The encouragement to settle claims in an “equitable, appropriate, 
and mutually agreeable manner” only applies when a museum finds 
that the work was stolen.344 Museums face a difficult situation when 
making the ethical decision not to restitute art legitimately acquired, 
even though on its face it appears to be a hostile decision.345 Museums 
should remember that although it is ethical to mediate or settle claims 
when an heir brings a legitimate claim of ownership, it is also ethical to 
pursue litigation when an heir brings a bogus claim of ownership.346
                                                                                                                      
339 See, e.g., Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *4; Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. 
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documented.”). 
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 What is unethical, however, is pursuing litigation when the owner-
ship claim is valid or if further research is needed.347 In Museum of Mod-
ern Art v. Schoeps, the parties also disagreed about whether a sale of 
paintings was made under duress.348 This dispute to settle title of two 
Pablo Picasso paintings between two museums (the Museum of Mod-
ern Art and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation) and Julius H. 
Schoeps, though, muddles the situation because although both muse-
ums filed a suit against the heir, the case settled, resulting in the muse-
ums keeping the artworks after paying the heir.349 If the museums 
chose to initiate legal action because their research showed the paint-
ings were never stolen, why did they settle the case and pay money to 
keep paintings supposedly rightfully theirs?350
 The settlement agreement is confidential, so it would be unfair to 
speculate about the museums’ fulfillment of the duty of care without 
knowing more about the terms of settlement and the motives behind 
it.351 The case can serve as an example, though, of how museums are 
still struggling to deal with Nazi-looted art claims and how, if more mu-
seums realized that foregoing litigation and instead restituting art ful-
fills their fiduciary duty, uniformity of action could be achieved.352
Conclusion 
 The Nazi regime produced some of the great tragedies of the 
modern age. It is more than ten years since museums, in recognition of 
this history, first started to promulgate specific codes of ethical conduct 
related to art stolen during World War II. Despite these professional 
codes of conduct, museums use affirmative defenses to bar claims by 
heirs; the recent declaratory judgment actions show that museums are 
confident with their legal defenses and will assert them. 
 Fiduciary duties do not provide clear guidance to museums about 
how to resolve Nazi-looted art cases. Museums can be torn between pre-
serving trust assets and deaccessioning stolen works in a way that en-
                                                                                                                      
347 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 16, §§ II.D, II.E; Guidelines, supra note 
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hances their reputation. By looking to the ethical codes for guidance, 
museums can use their discretion and follow those suggestions knowing 
it is a sanctioned way to fulfill their fiduciary duties. 
 When museums follow ethical guidelines, they do not breach their 
fiduciary duties. The ethical guidelines compel museums to work with 
heirs to find a mutually agreeable solution when the ownership claim is 
valid, but when the ownership claim is invalid, museums do not have to 
work with heirs and can pursue litigation. If museums decide to pursue 
litigation when an ownership claim is valid, though, then that action 
would be unethical. 
Emily A. Graefe 
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